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Based on a sociological case study on Kurdish mobilization in Marseille, France; this 
article aims to expose the intricate dynamics that affect the transformation of 
mobilization forms and strategies in diaspora. By conceiving the mobilization 
process as a career, it aims to analyze the evolution towards different situations like 
the host country’s politics or the critical events occurred in homeland or diaspora. In 
addition to these cornerstones increasing the legitimization of the Kurdish 
movement at local and global levels, this article aims to point out the emergence of a 
hybrid sphere of contention, which allows the inclusion of new actors in the 
transnational space of mobilization such as anarchist, anti-fascist activist networks. 
Acting together with traditional forms of contentious practices such as rallies and 
petitions; these hybrid mobilization strategies contribute to the durability and 
extension of the scope of diasporic action. 
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The Kurdish case provides a good ground in understanding 
plural dynamics of diasporization1
                                                 
1 The term “diasporization” is used to emphasize the processual dimension of a 
diaspora's construction. 
 built on experiences of 
oppression, forced displacement and exile, labor migration and 
insecure environment. Lately, by highlighting the plurality of 
diaspora experiences, some researches draw attention to the roles of 
transnational political activities and the diaspora’s relation with the 
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host states (Mügge, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Earlier theories 
used more essentialist categorizations shaped around exile and 
dispersion (Safran, 1991; Sheffer, 1986). As Adamson (2012) and 
Sökefeld (2008), this article conceives diaspora as socially constructed 
and generated by politics and as an imagined transnational 
community2. It results to a mobilization process at a transnational 
level led by political entrepreneurs. The Kurdish diaspora has been 
transnationally active and efficient in both raising the awareness of 
the immigrants on its main claims concerning the recognition of the 
Kurdish identity in Turkey, and the visibility of the Kurdish issue at a 
European scale. Whilst remaining a military organization, the PKK3
                                                 
2 Based on Anderson’s (1983) theorization of nation as an imagined community.  
3 PartiyaKarkerên Kurdistan (PKK), Kurdistan Workers’ Party, founded in 1974, 
leads the Kurdish movement and guerilla war which had its peak in 1990s. The 
resolution process, started in 2009, led to the declaration of a ceasefire by Öcalan in 
March 2013. This process had been hindered since June 2015.  
, 
known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, has evolved into a political 
and social movement with large transnational networks -including 
associations- since the 1990s (Jongerden and Akkaya, 2016). One can 
even argue that the party managed to relatively monopolize the 
Kurdish cause in Europe (Grojean and Massicard, 2005). 
The politicization of Kurdish migratory space lies within a specific 
mobilization process. It was led by the political refugees who 
immigrated to Europe in the early 1980s, and coincides with the 
beginning of the guerilla war in 1984 conducted by the PKK. Some of 
the refugees, who had concrete links with either the PKK and/or the 
fringe parties representing Kurdish movement, evolved into the 
diaspora elite, due to their high position within the diasporic social 
hierarchy but also because they benefit from both an activist know-
how and a social capital within and beyond the Kurdish immigrant 
group. However, the diasporization does not rely solely on the 
mobilization strategies and resources of the diaspora elite in order to 
construct the diaspora; it also benefits from the changing of local, 
national and global political landscapes.  
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Through the case of Kurdish community in Marseille4, this article 
focuses on the transformation of mobilization forms and strategies as 
part of the diaspora politics. Therefore, the term diasporization 
allows considering the constant (re)construction of a diaspora. 
Several actors participate in this process (States, immigrants, 
immigrants' organizations, etc.) at varying levels and with multiple, 
often uneven, capacities. Indeed, within a transnational space of 
mobilization, plural elements can affect diaspora’s repertoire of 
collective action in a complex way. The effectiveness of the Kurdish 
diasporic politics relies on the diaspora’s own resources, as the strong 
intricacy of immigrants’ social networks that enables the mobilization 
process. Host country’s dynamics, such as providing political 
opportunities to the immigrants also shape the political mobilization 
process. Still, the restricted national political frame, as in the case of 
France, should be considered together with the local and 
international social and political contexts, as well as the actors’ 
capabilities and strategies. This helps avoid considering the diaspora 
as a homogenous block, and to sociologize the issue of collective 
action in diaspora. In this regard, this article conceives the Kurdish 
diaspora’s mobilization as a career5
Within this conceptual framework, this article will first expose the 
characteristics of French political context and of the Marseille city as 
scenes of Kurdish diaspora’s contentious performances. Then, it will 
focus on the organizational structure of the mobilization, the Kurdish 
. Examining the mobilization 
process as being a career allows underlining the dynamism and 
subjectivity of diasporic experiences -based on diaspora actors’ 
strategies, capabilities and the sense they give to their diasporic 
identification- and the evolution towards different situations met -
like the host country’s politics or the critical events occurred in 
homeland or diaspora. 
                                                 
4 The data represented in this paper is a part of the fieldwork conducted between 
April 2011 and December 2015 in Marseille, France, for my ongoing PhD research on 
the community building process in Kurdish diaspora through political engagement. 
5 This concept, first used by Becker (1963), has been re-appropriated by Filleule 
(2001) and Massicard (2013) in their analysis of collective action and especially of 
individual commitment.  
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cultural association, to better grasp the mobilization mechanisms 
between a centralized model and decentralized application. Then, the 
external factors of the transformation of contentious performances 
will be exposed. It will especially focus on the role of the extra-
community links combined with the increasing legitimization of 
Kurdish movement and on the emergence of hybrid forms of 
contention between political and cultural fields.  
 
 
1. Diaspora politics in an assimilationist national frame and in a de facto 
multicultural city 
 
The Kurdish Institute of Paris (2014) estimates that there are over 
200,000 Kurds living in France -the second biggest country of 
reception after Germany. Like other host countries, France 
categorizes Kurds as nationals of their countries of origin unless they 
are asylum seekers. The historical motives of Kurdish immigration 
from Turkey to France are entangled; starting with the bilateral 
convention on labor migration in 1965, it donned a more political 
characteristic after the military coup in 1980. In 1990s, the flow 
increased as the conflict between the state’s armed forces and the 
PKK deepened. The Kurdish migratory space politicized by 
establishing several political organizations in Europe (e.g. FEYKA, 
KON-KURD) thanks to rights provided by the host countries, using 
their transnational network, the political entrepreneurs of diaspora 
could then focus on the establishment of cultural associations, media 
channels and publishing houses built on the diasporic identity. 
The Kurdish immigration in Marseille follows the same pattern. In 
the Bouches-du-Rhône department, where Marseille is located, the 
executives of the Kurdish association estimate their number around 
5,500-6,000 people6. This number might seem insignificant; especially 
for Marseille where Kurds are far from being the most populous 
immigrant group.7
                                                 
6 Based on an interview from May 2015. 
 Still, this city is considered a vital place of pro-
7 According to the 2012 census, Algerian immigrants constitute 2,82% of the 
The Kurdish Diasporic Mobilization in France 
 Journal of Mediterranean Knowledge-JMK, 2017, 2(1), 79-100 
ISSN: 2499-930X 83 
Kurdish mobilization by diaspora’s political entrepreneurs due to the 
high frequency of contentious actions. Thanks to dual nationality 
rights which allow practicing long-distance citizenship, Marseille is 
important for the vote-catching strategies of the pro-Kurdish political 
parties in Turkey.8
                                                                                                                  
global population of this department, while Turkish immigrants, including Turks 
and Kurds, represent 0,44%. 
8 For instance, Selahattin Demirtaş, the co-president of HDP, Democratic Party of 
Peoples, visited Marseille besides Paris during his electoral campaign in 2015. 
 Thus, a diaspora’s population-based extent is not 
always directly proportional to its mobilization force. A relatively 
small group can provide the positive conditions for the mobilization 
as it is not characterized by strong ideological differences (Başer, 
2013). How should the political dynamism in Marseille be 
understood if the French political system is less open to transnational 
political practices of immigrants, in comparison to Sweden (Khayati, 
2008) or Netherlands (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001)? 
The strategies of a transnational movement are often examined by 
considering the political opportunities offered in different national 
contexts where the movement is implanted (Koopmans and Statham, 
2001; Ögelman, 2003). Yet, the political opportunity structure of the 
host country, with its varying degrees of exclusion/inclusion of 
transnational political practices, is not by itself the frame that allows 
the realization of the mobilization. This last can occur in both cases 
but the strategies change. The immigrants’ integration and the 
homeland interest in their political practices are not antagonist 
issues. Nell (2008) argues the same in her study on the link between 
the homeland-oriented politics of immigrants from Turkey and the 
evolution of Turkish radical left movement in Netherlands. 
Moreover, the state should be examined as an arbitrary structuring 
actor and not as a stable entity with regular policies towards all the 
immigrant/foreigner groups. Hence the scientific challenge is “to 
assess the balance between state authority and non-state autonomy” 
(Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 779), in understanding how the 
immigrants’ homeland oriented political practices occur.  
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2. The French national context: which space for immigrants’ homeland 
oriented politics? 
 
In France, even though research on transnational ties and 
activities such as associative practices and cross-border commercial 
links are increasing, little is known about diasporas with a social 
movement dimension. The French republican political system is still 
strong despite the relative recognition of the French diversity in the 
2000s (Simon and Amiraux, 2006). The requalification of integration 
policies as anti-discrimination and integration policies, following the 
adoption of European Union law in 2000, might offer an opportunity 
for the construction of minority politics, even it does not rely on 
identity recognition politics (Fassin et al., 2006). Yet, the 
multiculturalism à la française is practiced in the new forms of public 
intervention illustrated by urban policies like the territorial 
affirmative action mechanisms (Doytcheva, 2007).  
The French civico-assimilationist model does not provide the 
immigrants with the necessary cultural resources for legitimizing 
their ethnic differences, unlike civico-pluralist models of Great 
Britain and Netherlands. Moreover, as in most countries in EU, the 
weakness of the opportunities given to collective action favor highly 
institutionalized actors and conventional forms of mobilization like 
lobbying. In this context, the popular mobilizations are not 
recognized to a great extent. Finally, the only way to have full access 
to the French political system is to obtain citizenship; a concept based 
on nationality. Immigrants from Turkey do not possess the right to 
participate in the municipal elections, unlike their EU counterparts. 
The host state still has a determinant role by setting boundaries of 
inclusion/exclusion through citizenship, immigrant/foreigner rights 
and limits of political mobilization forms (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2006). 
Furthermore, the homeland orientation in political transnational 
activities is perceived negatively in the French integration discourse 
due to the apprehension of the foreigners’ and immigrants’9
                                                 
9 The INSEE defines foreigner as ‘a person who resides in France and does not 
 non-
identification with the national community (Kastoryano, 1997).  
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In this national frame, the city of Marseille seems to crystallize the 
state policies between selective valorization of the multiculturality 
and stigmatization of immigration.  
 
 
3. Kurdish activism in Marseille 
 
Marseille is dominantly pictured for its urban anomaly widely 
associated with successive flows of immigration often badly 
managed by public authorities. The immigration phenomenon 
constitutes a deeply politicized issue, swinging between promoted 
cosmopolitanism and stigmatizing rhetoric associated with 
criminality. Without real multiculturalist politics, the cosmopo-
litanism is used in political speeches as well as cultural projects, but 
in a selective way. In some manner, it serves as a way-out from the 
integrationist system’s confines (Gastaut, 2003). Yet, the presence of 
immigrant populations is also considered as the main factor for the 
stigmatization of the city in political and media speeches that tend to 
reduce this demographically diverse state to a factor of delinquency 
(Mucchielli, 2013).10
The stigmatization of immigrant communities influences the 
perception of Kurdish activism, especially when it is associated with 
violence including acts of the PKK. Nonetheless, the fieldwork 
showed that it facilitates the perpetuation of a victimhood discourse
 
11
                                                                                                                  
possess French nationality’ and immigrant as ‘a person who is born a foreigner and 
abroad, and resides in France.’ In this paper, the term Kurdish immigrant is used not 
to exclude the ones with foreigner status but to mention a group with immigration 
history. 
10 Since mid-2011, the French government and most of media, have created a sort 
of constant alert about the unsecure environment of Marseille, based on illegal 
cannabis traffic and some violent actions. For more information, see: Mucchielli 
(2013).  
11 Many references to discriminatory and violent acts, as well as massacres 
Kurdish people have suffered during both Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic 
histories, are used in diaspora's political entrepreneurs’ speeches.  
 
used as a mobilizing strategy to strengthen the diasporic community 
links. Under these circumstances, political transnational practices 
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and identities can emerge or consolidate as a reaction to a deficient 
process of fragmented integration in the host society. 
However, one should not see in integrationist French policies an 
equitable consideration of its immigrant groups, since some 
recognition of ethnic-religious diversity is practically operated in 
local scale of governance. In case of Marseille, some scholars argue 
that the public authorities invent and consolidate the community 
notion, while still not offering equal integration policies (Mattina, 
2016), and pursuing a notability-favoring logic concerning the 
assertion of an ethnic or identity affiliation (Peraldi et al., 2015). 
Whether in the framework of the vote-catching strategy based on 
redistribution of the resources or of the symbolic recognition, the 
various communities are not provided equally of this relative right to 
make community. Besides being statistically invisible, perception of 
Kurdish immigrants by local political actors alternates between a 
worker-migrant group and a diasporic community as illustrated by 
the words of a Socialist Party representative, Henri Jibrayel: 
 
I like this silent and hard-working community; this Kurdish community that 
does not come to exploit the nation, demands very little assistance from the state, 
and respects the French government. I support the liberty of Kurdish people.12
To understand the intricate dynamics of the diasporic mobile-
zation evolution, the methodology chosen was to lead an 
ethnographic fieldwork. Allowing a quasi-immersed presence of the 
 
 
This arbitrary political position shows that when the benefits of 
immigrants are higher than their cost to the French state, the latter 
wants to welcome them. Yet, communities are not only invented by 
the political decision-makers, their self-legitimization modes are not 
always concomitant with the public ones. They have their own 
bottom-up mechanisms of invention, as for the political mobilization 
process in the diaspora context. In this regard, how the diasporic 
mobilization is (re)shaped between the imagination and structuration 
of the diasporic community by its political entrepreneurs?  
                                                 
12 Extract of his speech during the congress of Kurdish popular assembly in April 
2012.  
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researcher in the field this method offers a better understanding of 
the processual aspect of the change within the diaspora. It also 
allows completing the explicit discourses of actors with the ‘implicit 
significations’ (Lichterman, 1998), i.e., the everyday meanings of 
individuals’ activist practices such as the ways they define activism 
itself, practice the ideological founding principles or the ways they 
build social ties within the mobilization sphere. Fifty individuals 
participated in recorded semi-structured interviews, in addition to 
informal conversations. The sample included, regardless of gender 
and age, employers and employees in the food-service and 
construction industries, staff and members of Kurdish and Alevi13 
associations, non-adherent visitors of these associations, and 
participants of political demonstrations. The legal status of the 
interlocutors varied from irregular immigrants, asylum seekers, 
political refugees, to foreign workers and immigrants who came via 
family reunification. Multiple entries to the field and participant 
observations were vital to go beyond the formal rhetoric of Kurdish 
activists solicited by many researchers and journalists. In addition, to 
capture various levels of interactions, significant time was spent 
observing the participants at their workplaces (excluding the 
construction sites), within the aforementioned organizations and at 
political meetings as well as during public representations of political 
activism such as marches, rallies and sit-ins. The data collected from 
the press and media's online archives, and the Kurdish association’s 
archives complemented the analysis14
                                                 
13 Alevism is as a heterodox confession of Islam. Non-recognition of their 
worship and discrimination policies, led to the emergence of contentious 
mobilization in Turkey and Europe. The Alevi Cultural Center of Marseille, 
subordinated to the Federation of Alevi Unions of France which is linked to the 
Alevi Unions Confederation of Europe, operates as both an association and a place 
of worship.  
14 The association's activity reports are used to see the part of political and 
cultural activities regarding the general activities of the association. Data was 
compared with the online archives of Kurdish diaspora's and, of local and national 
French press and media's, to understand to what extent is the Marseille's Kurdish 
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4. The Cultural Center of Mesopotamia as a mobilizing structure of the 
diasporic community building15
We aim to give a roof to Kurds who are dispersed in several countries because of 
the war in their territories. People who are devoid of their origins, their identities 
suffer from alienation. It is then complicated to control them. A good organization of 
the community assures the acquisition of good values, of an essence and a form that 
corresponds to this essence.
 
 
The political entrepreneurs of diaspora work within Kurdish 
cultural associations established in Europe on behalf of the PKK’s 
ideology. Their main objective is to convey a collective Kurdish 
identity within the diaspora context, as explained by the president of 
the Cultural Center of Mesopotamia (CCM): 
 
16
The internal organization of CCM
 
 
Identity, community and control are used together to emphasize the 
necessity of uniting Kurds in the context of dispersion, to consolidate 
the communalization. This discourse points to the approach of political 
entrepreneurs who consider the whole Kurdish population -without 
differentiating between the individuals’ ethnic, confessional and 
national affiliations and their self-definition of Kurdishness- as a part 
of the diasporic community that needs to be organized both socially 
and politically. To create ‘coherent categories, discourses and 
symbols that can merge dispersed social networks under a single 
diasporic category’ (Adamson, 2012: 33) is, for the diaspora elite, the 
first step towards building a diasporic community via the activation 
of transnationally settled immigrants with entangled social networks. 
17, subordinates to the central 
model of the KCK the Union of Communities of Kurdistan18
                                                 
15 ‘Community building’ is used to emphasize the processual and interactive 
dimension of the community to analyze the communalization (Weber, 1922) together 
with the socialization processes and strategies.  
16 Extract of an interview on Radio Galère with the president of Cultural Center 
of Mesopotamia, on 04.04.2013.  
17 The Cultural Center of Mesopotamia was founded in 2009. After its dissolution 
in 2014, the Kurdish Democratic Center took its place. 
. The 
18 Founded in 2005, the Union of Communities of Kurdistan is based on a self-
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association is one of the committees constituting the Kurdish popular 
assembly in Marseille area. The association is the legal front of the 
political network due to the lack of legal structure in these 
assemblies. The configuration of popular assemblies and their 
committees consider the local scope of human resources/needs 
among the Kurdish population and vary in nature, from women’s to 
faith, education to media and press. They show how the political 
entrepreneurs of diaspora aim to build a politically engaged 
community formalized in regarding with norms and values diffused 
by the PKK’s ideology.  
As for the relation with the host state, the association acts under 
the French 1901 association law and thus can benefit from state’s 
subventions. However, the long-term observations on the 
association’s activities show the limits of the relations with the local 
authorities like the General Council of Bouches-du-Rhône and the 
Prefecture, apart from the organization of the political 
demonstrations. This avoidance strategy is related to the will of 
creating a maneuver space far from host state’s criminalizing 
practices. Like other pro-Kurdish establishments in Europe, CCM 
deals also with the host state’s interventions.19 The association 
undergoes quasi-regular police checks because of its financial 
support to the PKK. The PKK being still classified as an illegal 
organization20, the diaspora’s political actors cannot organize a 
professional fund raising campaign. The police inspections impact 
the legitimacy of the association by criminalizing the institution and 
its workers21
                                                                                                                  
government model within the PKK complex, and operates through open councils, 
town councils, local parliaments and larger congresses.  
19 Such as the TV channels like Roj TV closed by Denmark government in 2013. 
20 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/fr/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 32015D2430& 
qid=1457362568874&from=EN. 
21 The House of Kurdish People in Marseille was dissolved after a trial’s verdict in 
December 2013, because of financial support to the PKK via the associative structure.  
 which makes it impossible for Kurdish activists to 
involve lobbyists directly, leaving them reliant on their networking 
capacities with NGOs, political parties, and individuals to extend 
their claims. 
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This ambiguous relation with the public institutions portrays the 
heterogeneity of the state’s function. The state must be conceived as a 
set of institutions that can be in conflict (Jessop, 1990). It can apply 
contradictory policies simultaneously, such as partial recognition and 
discrimination. Yet, these constraining state maneuvers are not 
absolute barriers for the Kurdish activism. The insufficiency of 
institutions offering services oriented to immigrants in Marseille22
                                                 
22 There are few establishments of this kind, except the reception centers for 
asylum seekers (Centre d’Accueil pour Demandeurs d’Asile), an office of CIMADE 
(Comité Inter-Mouvements Auprès Des Evacués) which offer a service of solidarity 
specialized in immigrants’ and refugees’ rights, and a couple of translation / 
interpreting offices. 
 
helps CCM strengthen its representative and intermediary roles 
within the host society. On this issue, Wahlbeck (2007: 467) also 
underlined the role played by Kurdish organizations in helping 
newly arrived refugees within the host countries that mainly depend 
on charities and NGOs concerning the resettlement of refugees. 
Similar to immigrants’ homeland associations’ function, CCM is a 
sociability place for Kurdish immigrants. The association combines 
‘hot nationalism’ practices such as political demonstrations with 
‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995) that implies everyday political 
representations, through daily use of the association premises. 
CCM structure carries out the politicization of the Kurdish 
migratory space but, it does not own a strict authority and holistic 
functioning. The various affiliations (kinship, homeland, confessional 
and ideological), the different social trajectories of individual actors, 
lastly their socialization within and beyond the community, influence 
and process the so-called homogeneous mobilization forms in a 
complex way. The impact of intra-community dynamics on the 
evolution of the diasporization process is another major issue which 
will not be developed in this article This last instead focuses on the 
articulation between the Kurdish diasporic mobilization and the 
local, national and global political frames, for a better understanding 
of the socialization role of diaspora politics in the migratory career of 
a specific group.  
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5. Diaspora politics as a socialization factor  
 
Even though the discriminatory politics of the French state can 
hamper Kurds’ transborder citizenship and long-distance 
nationalism practices, the restricted national political framing can be 
bypassed by the extra-community cooperation, allowing the 
immigrant group access to the local activist and associative patterns. 
How can the extra-community factors widen the scale of diasporic 
activities? This scale jumping, referring to its conception by Gambetti 
(2009), implies the expansion of spaces of visibility, and mobilization 
of the Kurdish movement in Marseille, while building or 
consolidating its place in the local, national and transnational 
political and activist fields. The scale jumping process of the Kurdish 
mobilization has been accelerated by the war in Syria and Kobane 
resistance. These critical turns can be referred to as ‘bifurcations’23
The emergence of the second generation within the activist career 
of Kurds in Marseille - having lived different political socialization 
processes - plays a major role on this evolution. The term generation 
is not used here as a biographic phase of the life cycle, but to mention 
a socially constructed group. This is not in strict parallel with the 
ages of immigration, even if it intersects for some of actors, as there is 
already the third generation of immigration from Turkey in 
Marseille. It is conceived here as the second dynamic within the 
Kurdish activist career and differs from the first generation, by its 
larger networking capacities and relations with the local, national 
and transnational spaces of mobilization that become vital 
mobilizing resources within the scale jumping process. This second 
generation activism does not render invalid the first one that has 
more direct links to the PKK network and adopts more traditional 
strategies; but it offers, a third space, as in Bhabha (1996), of 
contention that includes more networking with external actors and 
more hybrid strategies capable of opening a space of negotiation. In 
 in 
the activist career of Kurdish diaspora.  
                                                 
23 A bifurcation implies an action sequence on micro level has more consequences 
than others. These consequences concern the macro level (Bessin et al., 2010). 
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this perspective, how and to what extent do certain events turn 
around diaspora’s activist career?  
 
 
6. Jumping scales: the Kobane impact 
 
Critical events become efficient tools for the diasporization 
process only when they are articulated by mobilization actors with 
‘new forms of action, discourse and ways of conceptualizing the 
world’ (Sökefeld: 2006: 275). The increasing recognition and 
legitimization of the Kurdish movement on the international level 
might change the marginal position of Kurds in the eyes of both 
politicians and social scientists.  
In a national scale, the war between the YPG24 and ISIL produced 
a partial recognition of the Kurdish movement by the French state.25 
In April 2015, a delegation of the PYD was received by the then-
president François Hollande. Together with the increasing 
publicization of the Kurdish issue in the national media, it improved 
the effectiveness of the Kurdish mobilization in France. However, it 
is imperative to mark the influence of diplomatic relations between 
home and host states in the way the latter perceives and recognizes 
certain aspects of diaspora and its claims. For instance, whilst France 
recognized the Kurdish delegation, they continue considering PKK 
as a terrorist organization. In that sense, the diasporic community 
feels the need to walk a tightrope; on one side, they carry the heritage 
claims and on the other, they need to deal with international political 
developments. To resolve this fragmented recognition of the Kurdish 
movement, the Kurdish associations in Europe amplified the work 
towards the removal of the PKK from the list of terrorist 
organizations with the solidarity of non-Kurdish associative and 
political actors.26
                                                 
24 The YPG (People’s Protection Units) is the military section of the PYD (the 
Democratic Union Party). 
25 Founded in 2003 and ideologically affiliated to the PKK, the PYD controls the 
Kurdish zones of the North Syria since 2011.  
 
26 In Marseille, the Amazigh associations, the Collective 13 for Women Rights, the 
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The most relevant example of the impacts of pro-Kobane 
resistance mobilization was triggered by a conflict between Kurdish 
activities and local authorities. During September 2014, the CCM 
organized several marches and gatherings, and occupied a part of the 
Vieux-Port, the most central and touristic area of the city, during one 
week throughout the day and night, despite being permitted only for 
the day hours. This legislative and spatial transgression shows how 
the activist groups try to transform the public spaces into their 
advantage, while the state tries to control them. The spatial 
transgressions have a symbolic dimension as they challenge the 
social order. The space being normatively constructed by the public 
authorities tends to exclude the others, in terms of social class, race, 
gender, ethnicity, etc. (Bourdieu, 1993). Yet, these social constructions 
are not static; they are continually contested and transgressed by the 
others who have been excluded. Indeed, the sub-prefect’s words were 
revealing the limits on political participation practices when the 
spatial public order is violated: 
 
You have your sisters and brothers there [in Kobane], you must help them one 
way or another. It’s not by acting like idiots under the Ombrière [a big parasol 
located in Vieux-Port] that you will help them. (…) The people from Marseille don’t 
give a damn, French people, generally speaking, have other worries, people don’t 
give a damn. (…) Don’t take us for fools, Mister who is not French.”27
The foreigner status of the activists is accentuated to mark the 
legitimacy concerns around homeland oriented activist practices 
though there is no legal restriction on foreigners’ political 
demonstration rights. Considering these grey zones between legality 
and legitimacy, the host state tries to keep its stakeholder role in its 
populations’ political involvement, especially when this engagement 
is homeland oriented. However, bifurcations such as violent actions 
on Kurds in Kurdistan(s) or in diaspora are capable of raising 
awareness among both the Kurdish community and the host society. 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
Communist Party, among others, participated in these demonstrations. 
27 A Kurdish activist has recorded their dialogue that was diffused online on local 
and national presses’ websites.  
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Another example of the multiplying effect of a particularly violent 
event on mobilizations (Oberschall, 2007) was the assassination of 
three Kurdish activist women in Paris in 2013.28
The role of women in the Kurdish movement has made itself a 
place in feminist activist networks and rhetoric too, as seen in the 
starting of the “World March of Women” from Rojava, in 2015, an 
international feminist action movement that declared solidarity with 
Kurdish women’s fight. For the International Journey for Women’s 
Rights, several French TV channels diffused, in 2016, documentaries 
and debates about the Kurdish fighters against ISIL and Sakine 
Cansız, the emblematic female leader of the PKK, assassinated in 
Paris.
 Indeed, the conflict 
with local authorities during pro-Kobane mobilizations passed on a 
national scale with its publicization through media channels. At this 
point, one could say that the ‘Kobane event’ generally contributed to 
the increasing recognition of perceiving Kurdish movement as an 
efficient warrior against the Islamist radicalism in the Middle-East.  
29 This was conceived as an ‘opportunity to seize’ by the 
Kurdish female activists, ‘in order to transform this publicization to a 
durable mobilization resource’30. Indeed, the committee in charge of 
social and cultural activities for the emancipation of Kurdish women 
became an assembly in 2014 and established an association named 
‘Arin Mirkan Center of Kurdish Women’ in 2015.31
At the same time, this specific conflict has multiplied the 
interactions between the Kurdish activist sphere and the host 
society’s space of mobilization. Non-Kurdish activist establishments 
like ‘SOS Racisme’
 
32 or ‘La Ligue des Droits de l’Homme’33
                                                 
28 A march was organized in Marseille with the participation of twenty-five 
political and associative organizations, from left-wing political parties such as 
French Communist Party to associations like Collectif Solidarite Maghreb, Collectif 
13 Droits des Femmes.  
29 The documentary “Femmes contre Daesh” diffused on LCP, the parliamentary 
channel, and the “Kurdistan, la guerre des filles” diffused on Arte TV, a franco-
german channel.  
30 Interview done in April 2015.  
31 The transformation of a committee into an assembly implies certain autonomy 
in the decisive and executive processes. 
 showing 
32 Founded in 1984, these associations aim to fight racism, anti-Semitism and all 
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solidarity with Kurdish activists might help them in long run to 
access more legitimate national spheres of activism.34
The extra-community links refer to interactions between some 
Kurdish activists and actors from other activist and/or cultural 
networks in Marseille. A recent cooperation of this kind is the 
 These 
solidarity forms might encourage the evolution of the Kurdish 
mobilization in diaspora from a homeland oriented mobilization to a 
new form of transnationalism, defined by more universalistic 
ideologies and human rights issues (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). 
These opening strategies approach the Kurdish mobilization to new 
contentious movements that do not just oppose one actor (the 
Turkish state), but also question the framing logic of their collective 
action as seen in the case of altermondialist movement in France 
(Sommier, 2006). 
This change being recent, it is difficult to see how the Kurdish 
activist rhetoric and mobilization strategies would evolve in long 
term, and influence the non-Kurdish activist sphere in Marseille. 
Still, the increasing new collaborations produce a certain self-
validation sense among the activists, in particular among the women 
for whom the political engagement operates as self-emancipation 
instrument. In other words, the growing collective integration to the 
local field of mobilization contributes to the individual integration of 
immigrants, while producing a positive identification process within 
the diasporic context.  
These new extra-community links also gives rise to a hybrid 
sphere of contention, hybrid not only because of its actors but also 
thanks to the politico-cultural performances of contention.  
 
 
7. Towards a hybrid sphere of contention? 
 
                                                                                                                  
forms of discrimination within the French society.  
33 This association, founded in 1898, aims to defend and promote the human 
rights within the public sphere in France. 
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‘Collective Rojava-Marseille’, built with the initiative of the anarchist 
activist network and of some second generation Kurdish activists. 
This collective organizes debates, demonstrations and cultural 
activities with the aim of raising awareness on the Kurdish struggle 
in Syria. They also lead charity projects like a library foundation in 
Rojava, thus, transnationalize their sphere of action. The main 
information diffusion channel remains online, reminding how the 
informational activism practices allow a reinterpretation of the 
symbolic management of conflict by giving new instruments to those 
who are mobilized (Granjon, 2001). 
At this point, it is not surprising to observe that the Kurdish actors 
in question have a good knowledge in French; they are actual 
university students or graduates in Turkey or in France. This 
explains their ability to diversify their extra-community links. They 
define themselves more integrated to the host country, yet with 
strong pro-Kurdish identity claims. Indeed, as indicated by Başer 
and Mügge, the integration does not spirit away the ethnic identity 
nor the political mobilization related to that. This second generation 
of activists has lived their first activist socialization in the host 
territories, within the Kurdish associations. On the other hand, their 
second socialization happens within the local activist spheres. They 
are also mobilized for other causes such as rights for irregular 
immigrants, bi-national couples, LGBT or volunteering for other 
political groups like left-wing political parties or anarchist groups. 
The extra-community activist relations are not absent in the first 
generation either; there are cooperations and links with activist or 
political actors such as Amazigh Cultural Association35
                                                 
35 This association promotes cultural diversity and aims to facilitate the 
integration of Marseille’s Franco-Berber community. 
, French 
Communist Party or feminist groups like Collectif 13. However, the 
second group opens themselves to more heterodox groups. In the 
case of United Kingdom, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003: 773) mentions 
also ‘surprising coalitions’ emerged between local political 
organizations and immigrants’ organizations seeking for 
legitimization, like the exchange between the Welsh Independence 
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Party and a German-based pro-PKK Kurdish organization. Lastly, 
and perhaps more importantly; the new hybrid organizational 
structures allow a better integration within the local sphere of 
political and/or cultural contentious mobilizations.  
Regarding the reception of these new links by the local diaspora 
elite, mainly formed by first generation of activists, one should notice 
a consolidation strategy of these ties in the absence of formalized 
collective projects. The Kurdish actors taking these extroversive 
initiatives are also members of committees; which facilitates the 
relative control on their external activities. Even so, the choice of 
external partners or the contents of the collaboration sometimes lead 
to interpersonal conflicts within the political network. ‘Our objective 
has to be to integrate the political parties to have a voice within the 
National Assembly; not to collaborate with the marginal groups. 
After all, we are being marginalized ourselves; we must be able to 
connect more with major groups’, say for instance a member of 
Marseille’s popular assembly.36
On the extra-community organizational structures, one should 
finally notice that similar structures to ‘Collective Rojava-Marseille’ 
have emerged in other countries of Europe, witnessing their 
transnational implantation.
 This latent conflict could hint at a 
potential challenge by these emerging links of the existing strong 
ones and diaspora elite’s ideological monopoly. 
37
                                                 
36 Interview done in May 2014. 
37 In Spain for example, committees of solidarity with Rojava have been 
established in several cities such as Madrid and Granada. 
 Several Facebook groups, websites and 
online blogs have been founded around the world in such sense to 
build a transnational network of mobilization. At this point, one 
should note that cooperations with anarchist and anti-fascist groups 
were already present in Germany in 1980 and 1990’s (Grojean, 2008). 
Nonetheless, the Rojava and Kobane events had a multiplier effect on 
this effervescence. Yet, these cooperations are still new; it is not 
possible to say if it might produce a new radicalism in Kurdish 
repertoire of collective action. 
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The mobilization is a multilevel process depending on political 
events in the homeland, the diasporic political entrepreneurs’ 
mobilization activities, and the individuals’ migratory experiences in 
the host land. In this perspective, this article sought to question the 
plural dynamics affecting diaspora politics in an exclusive national 
frame of political opportunities for immigrants and foreigners. The 
article showed that the restricted national political framing can be 
bypassed by the global communication -reinforced by technological 
tools- of critical events that may result or strengthen the 
diasporization process. This contributes to the scale jumping of the 
mobilization, as seen in the example of Kobane resistance on the 
increasing effectiveness of the Kurdish diasporic projects in the host 
land. In addition to these bifurcations, this article pointed out the role 
of the second generation of activists who rely on higher networking 
capacities with local and transnational activist fields and on ability of 
multiplying different mobilization forms and strategies. These 
hybrid strategies of mobilization, act together with traditional forms 
of contentious practices such as rallies and petitions; in such sense 
that they extend the scope of diasporic action. This transformation 
being an ongoing process, pursuing this analysis with a specific focus 
on the new strategies deployed by the second generation activists, 
would allow better understanding if the translocal space of 
contention in diaspora context, by reaching beyond geographic or 
national boundaries, will lead to new sources of identification and 
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